Los mejores 6 Ecografos Voluson Generales Electricos.

Opinión de un comprador: Texto para esos que deseen conceptos rápidos y sencillos en ecografía a pie de cama, bien explicados. Bastante buena compra. Aconsejable.

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Opinión de un comprador: First let me put in context my interest in this book. I am a GE employee, not by choice, but through chance as the company I worked for was taken over 9 years ago (I was a bit disappointed that the takeover was not mentioned in the book, although I guess $3 billion dollars is small fare in this story). As such I lived within some of the story laid out here and for me it is fascinating to see what was going on behind the scenes at board level, since most of that was hidden as mere employees. Fascinating and slightly horrifying that a company with such a reputation as Ge could be so dysfunctional.
The book also echoes a lot of what I have learned about GE. The 1st thing you need to know is that there are two world views of GE. In America, GE status is almost mythological. This stems from the 60s and 70s when GE seemed to run American life from jets, power turbines to fridges and toasters. There was not a part of US life that GE did not touch. Not only that but it seemed very good at making money. Under their CEO Jack Welch, growth seemed limitless and the shares were the darling of pension plans offering a safe haven and guaranteed dividends. In the rest of the world however, GE does not have the same status. Yes it has a big presence in the other parts, but it was little known outside the niches.
The book starts off with GE history. If you work in GE you are told we are the child of Thomas Edison, the master inventor (in fact if you visit GE research in Niskyuna, you will find Edison's desk preserved in the entrance). However like a lot of the Edison story, this is not really true. As the book sets out, GE was a creation of failed Edison businesses joined together by the banker J. P. Morgan, and Edison had little to actually do with the company. So rather than a industrial company based on the ideals of industrial innovation, it was a company set up by a finance house for industrial domination. That characteristic forms a large part the rest of the story.
The story starts with the legendary chairman Jack Welch who kit out transforming the company and become a byword for managerial excellence. However hidden under the success story is another one of shady accounting practices, labyrinths of financial deals and disminuir structures which were used to maintain the myth of almost infinite growth.
As such the industrial side was supported by the rise of behemoth GE capital which tapped the financial instrument market to ensure a steady supply of cash. In doing so its tentacles spread wide to tap new lines of credit with little apparent appreciation of risk. It feels in hindsight that Jack Welch main talent was in timing and being able to ride the wave of fast growing economy while not having to be held into account for the consequences years into the future. I was also a little disappointed that there was little analysis of one of Jack Welch's worst legacy's, a system called stack ranking which rated everyone and the lowest diez% were forced to leave. This system which at the time was lauded, has been shown to be in the long term destructive as it creates a atmosphere of back stabbing and distrust in a business and was widely sited as one of the reasons that Microsoft lost there way in he the noventa's. While no longer implemented, its shadow still escenarios the culture in GE today and may well have been partly to blame for the Ge capital risk taking culture.
In 2001, Jeff Immelt took over as CEO. Mr Immelt is a very charismatic character, however his background was estropear rather than engineering and he struggled with running a company which was both large and schizophrenic in character. The vital side providing huge dividends, but with large risks while the industrial side being less profitable, but more stable. This came to ahead almost instantly he took over with the aftermath of the 9/once attacks and the financial fallout meaning that the básico market shrank overnight. In some way Immelt could be considered unlucky, however the aftermath of a charismatic CEO meant that the board was no longer functioning and failed to rein in a CEO with limited experience. This was shown in two episodes.
Firstly was one of Immelt's main initiative, the profesional internet.
The iniciativa of the profesional internet was the idea of connecting data from industrial sources to generate new industries around that data. In many ways the iniciativa is a valid one, unfortunately the implementation under-estimated the cost and difficulties. As someone who was involved, I can attest to this. Rather than take a evolutionary acceso, GE pumped money into it setting up GE software in California to drive it forward. There were two problems with this. Firstly the GE software department tried to do everything from writing the whole industrial stack to creating the entire data infrastructure to store the data. Despite GE's size it was not a programa company and just did not have the resources to manage this. Instead it should of created partnerships to piggy back off someone like IBM. Amazon etc. Secondly there was a big ethos clash between the east coast traditional industries and the west coast new technology gurus. One was traditionally conservative (after all you can't have a crema engine fail in the air), while the other was more just try it and see. The lack of direction and misunderstanding of the two philosophies meant that money was being pored in with realice objective, other than a vague sales slogan.
The second was the purchase of Alstom, a large French owned supplier of power generating equipment. Jeff Immelt kit his reputation on purchasing this, however to virtually everyone else it seemed a strange purchase. Before becoming part of GE, we had been part of Alstom and we could attest that it was a company with big problems largely propped up by the French government. The more the negotiations went on and the bigger concessions GE had to make, the less sense it made. In fact the French government really out manoeuvred GE by getting GE to take a troubled nationalised industry off their hands and at the same timer guaranteeing no job losses for a long period, something that even now rankles in GE outside France. The fact that the board failed to rein Jeff Immelt in and Immelt himself could not see the issues pointed to a company no longer in full control or good governance.
Jeff Imelt's reign came to an end in 2017, and the CEO position was breifly held by John Flannery. However the excesses of the two previous CEO's and the lack of adaption to the changing market had pretty well made it an impossible job. Also some of the risks taken by Vital came back to haunt GE with a huge debt to finance health insurance policies taken out earlier. Also there had been huge investment in both fluido turbines and oil production companies. However the rise in renewables had stopped any growth in the former, and the crash in the oil price had severely dented the latter. What Flannery did do however was a well overdue shake up of the board and remove some the excesses like the 2 planes Immelt had used to travel in.
My own story in GE, echoes much of this. In many ways I was there at the beginning. I had visited our CEO as part of a program to allow engineers to meet our then CEO. They had to regularly exit the room to take phone calls, and he asked our group whether our company should remain independent. Obviously he could got give details, but in hindsight they were being wooed by GE. And our company had been a success. We had grown to a billion dollar company in 5 years, by being agile, responsive and innovative. However what was stopping us growing was the lack of básico to take on larger projects. Being part of GE seemed to promise us that access.
A number of important things changed when we were taken over however. Firstly our CEO had always travelled on his own. The first meeting of our new boss, was when we were bussed to football stadium and he arrived flanked by about 20 flunkeys. The senior management team were sent to a alojamiento in Dubai, where a video was made of a speech that looked more like a evangelical rally than a conference. Our CEO had setup a system where you could directly ask him a question. While sometimes abused it provided a communication channel to raise issues and queries. This quickly stopped and it became clear that information would flow only from top to bottom. Our head office had been a single floor of a shared office in a industrial suburb of Paris. That apparently did not meet the image of GE, and was moved to a an expensive old building in central Paris. Or so I'm told because no one outside the top team were allowed to visit.
More importantly the management structure changed from a pyramid to a matrix. This meant there was no longer any direct decision making responsibility anymore. The management decided that they no longer wanted us to do the systems, but make products. Systems are more difficult to manage, but products require a whole different mindset. We were told that we were to transform GE, but we quickly found that other parts of GE either kept us at arms length because we threatened their jobs, or saw us as an easy sales win as part of the GE to GE program.
We had been bought because we were what GE was not, agile Innovative and not risk averse. After spending 3 billion to take us over, they then kit about trying to make us more like GE. At the same time, costs were piled on us. GE companies are run more like franchises with each one paying for headquarter's services. So each excess of the board and each corporate jet set was paid for by the businesses in a reduced bottom line. Another thing is that our CEO was an ex-engineer. They knew the product as well as the business. In GE, it seems to rise to the top you need to be from either estropear of finance. Engineers have a managerial glass ceiling.
So back to the book. Generally it gives a fascinating insight into one of the worlds biggest companies and some iniciativa on how it lost its way. Certainly it gave me insights in many of the things that affected me directly as an employee.
However I do feel that the authors missed a trick.
The GE story is actually an American story. How companies that made things got seduced away into the world of financial instruments. Where making money is mistaken for making wealth. The truth is the GE myth was a much based on sleight of hand that industrial excellent. It was only federal laws such as the Frank Dodds act that stripped away much of the obfuscation and allowed investors to get a true view of what was going on. Those laws however are under attack by the right wing de-regulation lobby who feel that governments should not have companies oversight. It would of been a useful last chapter for the authors to look at the present state of American capitalism and tie to the how it should change to meet the challenges of a rapidly changing world.
The GE story is the American story. How a company famous for making everything from toasters to aircraft engines forgot its roots and became an emperor with new clothes. It is a lesson on the dangers of the deification of CEO's, cosy wall street relationships and lack of business transparency. It is a lesson on how companies lose touch with their employees and how to big to fail is not actually a thing. In the end it is a lesson how America industry lost its way

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Opinión de un comprador: He leído el primer trozo en el Kindle y me gustó tanto que decidí comprarlo en formato papel para preservarlo.
Mi primera desilusión fue que el libro era mínimo, bastante menos que "de bolsa", te caben 4 planos en el bolso de la bata.
Mi segunda desilusión fue que la traducción a veces proporciona lugar a confusión, por ejemplo está diciendo que la ecografía permite la "reanimación continuada" y en el contexto en el que lo utiliza da sitio a varias posibles interpretaciones.
Lo bueno es que el libro, a efectos prácticos, da lo que asegura: Formación básica en ecografía. Explica cosas que ningún texto de radiología contempla como las clases de sondas y para qué exactamente se utiliza cada uno de ellos, cómo ubicar la sonda o para qué vale cada pulsador del ecógrafo.
Si no sabes ecografía y no dispones de un radiólogo que te de clases individuales, este texto es sin ningún tipo de duda una buena alternativa, aunque yo me lo entraría sin duda en forma kindle.

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